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On the Nature of Happiness in Kant’s System of Philosophy 
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Jiafeng Wang 
 This essay provides an overview of the nature of happiness in Kant’s system of 
philosophy. It is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the conflict 
between virtue and happiness, and begins by examining the nature of happiness itself. In 
the first section, we will learn that happiness, for Kant, is wholly empirically. Happiness 
is but an idea of the imagination, which is incited by experience. As a result, principles of 
happiness, or laws to which the end is the acquisition of happiness, can never be 
unconditional. One can never say that what must be done for the acquisition of happiness 
ought to be done under any condition, for to the extent that the idea of happiness is 
subject to constant change, the means to its acquisition are also subject to change.  
 Section two examines happiness in the constitution of the highest good. As we 
will learn, happiness, for Kant, despite not being the unconditional good, not only 
belongs to, but also completes the highest good that human beings can enjoy. For while 
morality is the unconditional good that all human beings ought to strive for, morality 
alone is insufficient. There is nothing desirable in seeing a good man suffer. To complete 
the attainment of the highest good, morality must be conjoined with the enjoyment of 
happiness.  
 In the last section, this essay examines the opponents of Kant’s moral theory, 
which are the Stoics and the Epicureans. Here, we will discuss what Kant believes to be 
the arguments of both sides, and how he proceeds to refute them. For Kant, the Stoics and 
the Epicureans made a theoretical mistake when they took virtue and happiness to be 




either virtue or happiness alone, but disagrees as to which of the two must be attained 
first. For the Stoics, virtue contains happiness, for the Epicureans, the rational 
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The relationship between virtue and happiness has been an enduring problem in 
the history of political philosophy. For while many may agree that the highest way of life 
ought to be both virtuous and pleasurable, it is often the case that the two are mutually 
exclusive. When Socrates recites the allegory of Heracles at the crossroads, Heracles was 
shown to make a choice between the road to virtue and the road to happiness.1 The road 
to virtue is a road of labor and attentiveness, while the road to happiness is a road of 
easiness and pleasure. Virtue requires hard work, but hard work implies displeasure. 
Therefore, Heracles could not have both. The result of this is that many philosophers 
have attempted to redefine virtue and happiness, so as to resolve the conflict. Two of the 
most well-known ancient schools of thought that have attempted such endeavor are 
perhaps the Stoics and the Epicureans, both of which tried to synthesize virtue and 
happiness. The Stoics argue that consciousness of one’s virtue is happiness, while the 
Epicureans argue that the rational pursuit of happiness is virtue.2 Both schools believe 
that virtue and happiness are one and the same thing, though they disagree as to which of 
the two must take precedence. For the Stoics, virtue must come before happiness. For the 
Epicureans, happiness must come before virtue.  
 This essay discusses Kant’s opinion on the relationship between virtue and 
happiness. For Kant, who disagrees with both the Stoics and the Epicureans, holds virtue 
and happiness to be completely different, if not antithetical, ideas. Indeed, both schools 
were subject to Kant’s criticism for their synthesis of virtue and happiness. Unlike the 
Stoics, Kant believes that happiness is wholly empirical. Unlike the Epicureans, Kant 
 
1 Xenophon, Memorabilia, Book 2, Chapter 1.  
2 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (henceforth: Crit. Prac.), trans. Mary J. Gregor, (Cambridge UP: New 




holds that the attainment of virtue must take precedence over happiness. And unlike both 
schools, Kant, who believes that virtue and happiness are both elements of the highest 
life, does not believe that there is any necessary relation between the two elements. That 
is, the pursuit of happiness can never be moral, while the attainment of virtue can never 
guarantee the enjoyment of happiness. To the extent that happiness is wholly empirical, 
the enjoyment of happiness also depends on chance. A person can never be sure that his 
attempt to be happy will not be sabotaged by some unfortunate accident. As a result, the 
closest that human beings can get to living the highest life is to live morally, and to leave 
the rest to chance. As human beings, we can always hope that nature will reward the good 
with the happiness they deserve, but never to expect it. It is as if that nature did not want 
our respect for the moral law to be tainted by inclinations of happiness. It is as if that 
nature has willed that if man has become moral, that nothing should take credit for his 
achievements except for his own free will, hence the third thesis of Kant’s Idea for a 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent: 
“Nature has willed that man, entirely by himself, produce everything that goes 
beyond the mechanical organization of his animal existence and partake in no 
other happiness or perfection than what he himself, independently of instinct, can 







3 Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent (henceforth: Universal History), trans. Ted. 




Part 1: On the Antinomy Between Virtue and Happiness 
Section I: On the Nature of Happiness 
 For Kant, the concept of happiness is not something that human beings have 
abstracted from experience, for no human being has ever experienced what he 
understands to be happy. Instead, happiness is an idea of the imagination.4 As rational but 
finite beings, human beings are beings of constant need. Without a constant supply of 
food, water, or shelter, human beings, finite as they are, would have perished a long time 
ago. Therefore, human beings must devote themselves to the constant satisfaction of their 
needs. For this purpose, human beings, like other animals, are endowed with the power of 
what Kant refers to as the reproductive imagination, or the power to visualize an earlier 
memory. When a man encounters a lion, his reproductive imagination recalls the time 
that he saw a deer getting mauled by a lion. As a result, the man recognizes the lion to be 
a threat to his life, and tries to escape. Likewise, when a person finds a stream of water, 
his reproductive imagination recalls all the instances when water proved to be a means of 
satisfaction for his thirstiness. As the reproductive imagination goes to work, human 
beings, like all other animals, find the means to relief their immediate feelings of pain.  
Unlike other animals, however, human beings are also endowed with the 
productive imagination. The productive imagination is the ability to visualize what the 
subject has hitherto never seen, heard, or experienced. The material of these 
visualizations is supplied by the subject’s previous experiences. Indeed, of all animals on 
earth, human beings alone seem to have the ability to fantasize. The unicorn, the sphinx, 
or the Cerberus, are all ideas of the productive imagination. As human beings fantasize 
 
4 Cf. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (henceforth: Anthropology), trans. Victor Lyle 




about the unknown, whether it is the heaven, the underworld, or just uncharted parts of 
the earth, they can only imagine the sort of extraordinary creatures that inhabit these 
places. Likewise, the idea of happiness is also a product of the productive imagination. 
As man labors from day to day to procure his daily necessities, his productive 
imagination conjures the idea of a state in which all of his necessities will be satisfied for 
all eternity, and he will no longer have to work for a single day for the rest of his life. 
That state, or the state in which man will no longer need to ease his pain, is the state of 
happiness.  
 The productive imagination is not only responsible for creating the idea of 
happiness. It is also responsible for mankind’s worst miseries. This is because the 
productive imagination is the cause of anxiety. For while the reproductive imagination 
incites fear of what is immediately present, the productive imagination is able to incite 
fear even when the object of fear has not yet come into being. King Laius, for instance, 
lived in constant fear of the possibility that one day he will die of a violent death at the 
hands of his own son.5 He yearned for a state in which he will no longer have such 
worries, and as a result, he ordered his newborn to be tossed off of a cliff. The fear of 
violent death is only the most extreme form of anxiety caused by the productive 
imagination. Less extreme forms include the fear of financial instability or the fear of the 
loss of reputation, both of which has been responsible for some of history’s worst 
atrocities. For as long as human beings are endowed with the productive imagination, 
without which they would be no different from animals, they will never be freed from the 
 




curse of anxiety.6 Therefore, happiness, as Shell puts it, is the carefree expectation of the 
future.7  
 The idea of happiness, however, is impossible to attain in this world.8 For the 
productive imagination, otherwise known as reason, taps into another world, namely, the 
noumenon, or the world of ideas. The noumenon is a much bigger world than the one that 
the human body inhabits. The world that the human body is placed is a spatial-temporal 
world, known as the phenomenon. The human mind, on the other hand, dwells in a 
temporal world that is non-spatial. For Kant, time is the a priori condition of all intuitions 
in general.9 Space, however, is limited as an a priori condition merely to outer intuitions. 
Therefore, while both worlds are subject to time, the phenomenon alone is subject to 
space. As a result, whatever intuition that occurs in the noumenon, it must be able to be 
defined spatially in order to be possible in the phenomenon. However, one of the crucial 
limitations of the phenomenon is that anything within it must be finite. For in the 
phenomenon, space and time are the only things infinite. There is only one space, one 
time, and everything else that is placed within it. Therefore, anything that pertains the 
quality of infinity has no possibility of being defined spatially. A unicorn, or a sphinx, 
while they may appear to be impossible, can nevertheless be regarded as being possible, 
insofar as their properties are finite. A sphinx, for instance, is simply a being with the 
head of a man and the body of a lion. It is entire possible to think of such a being to exist 
in the world of phenomenon as the result of some rare accident. By contrast, God, insofar 
 
6 The productive imagination is what is responsible for what Rousseau refers to as mankind’s perfectibility. 
For it is the anxiety or the desire of a certain future that incentivized human beings to perfect themselves. 
The result of their attempt to perfection is history. Cf. Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality.  
7 Susan Shell, The Rights of Reason, (University of Toronto Press: Toronto Buffalo London, 1980), p. 75. 
8 Kant, Crit. Prac., 5:22. 
9 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans & edited. Allen. Wood, Paul Guyer, (Cambridge UP: New York, 




as he is omnipotent and omniscient, or in a word, infinite, is impossible to define 
spatially. Likewise is the idea of what many people understands to be happiness. For 
happiness is not simply the satisfaction of this or that desire in particular, but the 
satisfaction of all desires conceivable. As a result, the attainment of happiness requires 
omnipotence and omniscience, both of which qualities are impossible for human beings, 
whose material properties are spatially defined. 10  Only God, who enjoys an infinite 
existence, has the privilege to be happy.  
  Like all ideas of the imagination, the idea of happiness originates in experience. 
This is because the imagination is not a creative faculty. Any idea of the imagination 
must come from somewhere in experience. To use one of Rousseau’s examples in the 
Discourse on Inequality, it is impossible to imagine a tree in general.11 Every tree that a 
human being can imagine must have its origin somewhere in the person’s experience. If a 
person has only ever seen maple trees, then he is only capable of relating the concept of a 
tree to maple trees. If a person has only ever seen pine trees, then he is only capable of 
relating the concept of a tree to pine trees. If a person was born blind, then he will be 
utterly incapable of relating the concept of a tree to anything. For Kant, the same rules 
apply to happiness.12 A person’s idea of happiness will always be determined by his 
experience. This is why while happiness is necessarily the desire of every rational but 
finite being, every human being will also have a different idea of what it means to be 
happy. For a politician, happiness may be the state in which he has attained the highest 
honor. For a philosopher, happiness may be the state in which he has attained the truth. In 
 
10 Kant, Crit. Prac., 5:22.  
11 Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, Part One.  




each case, the idea of happiness is determined by singular moments of pleasure, whether 
it was experienced by the person himself or by another person to whom he was a witness. 
In the case of the politician, his idea of happiness may have originated from reading the 
lives of Caesar and Alexander. In the case of the philosopher, his idea of happiness may 
have originated from being exposed the Platonic dialogues. At any rate, to the extent that 
the substance of happiness has its origin in experience, the nature of happiness must also 
be empirical.  
 Kant, however, did not always regard happiness to be empirical. As Shell 
suggests, the early Kant regarded the substance of happiness to be empirical, but the form 
to be intellectual.13 He believed that “happiness is properly not the [greatest] sum of 
pleasures, but rather the pleasure [Lust] in consciousness of contentment with one’s own 
power [Selbstmacht].”14 Therefore, the early Kant was rather close to the Stoics, insofar 
as both believed happiness to be a state of mind. In later reflections, however, Kant came 
to realize that a moral theory which involves the synthesis of pleasure and self-
contentment is indefensible. As a result, he came to argue that happiness is empirical 
through and through. In his final teachings, Kant abandoned the effort to understand 
happiness as the synthesis of pleasure and self-contentment in order to refute critics who 
explained his moral theory to be eudaimonistic. As a result, happiness is simply the sum 
of all conceivable pleasures. Happiness, in the Critique of Practical Reason, appears as 
the “consciousness of the agreeableness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole 
existence.”15  
 
13 Shell, The Rights of Reason, p. 75.  
14 Kant, Reflexion #7202, trans. Susan Shell, in The Rights of Reason, p. 75.  




 The empirical nature of happiness has important consequences. For one, 
principles of happiness can never be unconditional. To the extent that the idea of 
happiness is determined by singular moments of experience, each additional moment of 
experience will always have the power to change a man’s opinion on what it means to be 
happy. As a result, both the object of happiness as well as the means to acquire happiness 
are subject to constant change. The validity of any maxim to which the end is the 
attainment of happiness will always be conditioned by experience. No principle of 
happiness can ever guarantee the attainment of happiness, for the idea of happiness itself 
is subject to constant change. A person may believe the life of honor to be the happiest 
life today, but hold the life in pleasure to be the happiest life tomorrow. Achilles, for 
instance, once believed that happiness is to have one’s name remembered by all 
subsequent generations. After he reached the underworld, however, he regretted his 
decision to die young. The object of happiness for Achilles changed from honor to 
pleasure as a result of his experience in the underworld. For Kant, this is especially the 
case for those who believe in reason’s enlightenment.16 For these people, whose object of 
happiness was wisdom, has only found themselves more miserable than before. For after 
“calculating all the advantages they derive… they yet find that they have in fact only 
brought more trouble on their heads than they have gained in happiness.”17 As a result, 
“they come to envy, rather than despise, the more common run of men who are closer to 
the guidance of mere natural instinct and who do not allow their reason much influence 
on their conduct.”18  
 
16 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (henceforth: Groundwork), trans. James W. Ellington, 






 To the extent that the substance of happiness is empirical, the means to its 
acquisition is also subject to chance. For human beings are finite beings, whose reason 
and imagination are also finite. Human beings are neither omnipotent or omniscient, 
which implies that there will always be uncertainties outside of their control. Hence, 
whatever means by which human beings attempt to be happy, there will always be the 
possibility that their plan will be sabotaged by some unfortunate accident. For this reason, 
there can never be any secure path to the attainment of happiness, even for he who is the 
most deserving of it in every way conceivable. As Kant writes in the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment: 
“… it is so far from being the case that nature has made human being its special 
favorite and favored him with beneficence above other animals, that it has rather 
spared him just as little as any other animal from its destructive effects, whether 
of pestilence, hunger, danger of flood, cold, attacks by other animals great and 
small, etc.…”19  
Section II: The Antithesis Between Virtue and happiness 
 Traditionally speaking, the enjoyment of happiness has always been antithetical to 
the attainment of virtue. The relationship between virtue and happiness was well defined 
by the problem of Heracles at the crossroads. The road to happiness is to follow one’s 
inclinations to pursue what is immediately pleasurable. The road to virtue requires the 
suppression of one’s inclinations for the sake of a higher good. As a result, the attainment 
of virtue and the enjoyment of happiness are mutually exclusive.  
 Kant, however, understand the problem differently. For Kant, the antithesis 
between virtue and happiness is a conflict between freedom and blind force. For insofar 
 
19 Kant, Critique of Judgment (henceforth: CJ), trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, (Cambridge UP: New 




as the idea of happiness is determined by experience, the pursuit of happiness is always 
pathological. When a person does anything for the sake of happiness, he is merely doing 
what his environment has compelled him to do; the person is not making the decision 
himself, though he may be conscious of it. Hence, as long as an action is determined by 
the desire for happiness, the action can never be free, and its agent can never take 
responsibility. Indeed, a grave problem with Kant’s moral theory is that human beings are 
only free when they suppress their inclination for happiness. For the idea that human 
beings can never take credit for actions determined by the desire for happiness implies 
that no human being can ever be held accountable as long as his actions were 
incentivized by pleasure. If a man commits rape because doing so makes him happy, a 
Kantian moralist simply would not be able to hold the culprit accountable. On the other 
hand, however, the idea that human beings cannot be responsible for actions determined 
by inclinations of happiness also implies that human beings cannot take credit for actions 
in conformity with duty, but done for the sake of happiness. For insofar as all actions 
determined by inclinations of happiness are the result of blind force, actions that are 
merely in conformity with the moral law are no exception.  
 Therefore, the problem between virtue and happiness is not so much that there is 
no inherent worth in actions determined by the desire for happiness, but that human 
beings who acted on their desire cannot be responsible for their actions. For Kant, only a 
free agent can take ever credit for his actions, but the only actions he can take credit for 
are actions independent from his inclinations. The desire for happiness takes away the 
freedom of human beings, and as a result, actions determined by inclinations of happiness 




Indeed, every action has its own value. Actions which has reference to general 
human inclinations and needs has a market value; actions which has reference to a certain 
taste has an affective value; and actions in conformity with the moral law has intrinsic 
worth, (i.e. dignity).20 The first two forms of actions both refer to the idea of happiness, 
with the only difference being that the first refers to the opinions of human beings in 
general, while the second refers to the opinions of individuals in particular. Insofar as the 
enjoyment of happiness is the standard by which the value of an action is determined, the 
same action can always have different values for different people, or even different 
values for the same person under different circumstances. For this reason, the value of 
actions that refer to the idea of happiness is relative, whereas the value of actions in 
conformity with the moral law is absolute. The moral law is indifferent to any empirical 
conditions, and as a result, the value of actions in conformity with duty is unaffected by 
experience. Whatever duty a moral law demands, the doing of that duty alone is good 
without qualification. The only question is whether the person who acted in conformity 
with duty has the right to claim its value. For Kant, only those who acted willingly for the 
sake of duty has the right to this claim.  
Qualifications 
 To the extent that actions determined by principles of happiness can never be 
moral, a suspicion may arise as to whether human beings ought to avoid the pursuit of 
happiness altogether. After all, the pursuit of happiness is not always inconsistent with 
the moral law. It is entirely possible to act in conformity with the moral law, but for the 
 




sake of happiness. Therefore, a question may arise as to whether this third form of action 
ought to be avoided, so as to ensure the attainment of genuine moral worth.  
 To be sure, no action determined by the desire for happiness can ever be virtuous, 
or have genuine moral worth. If an action is in conformity with the moral law, but done 
for the sake of happiness, then the action will contain legality, but never morality. The 
action is legal because the action itself does not transgress the moral law; the action lacks 
morality because its incentive was a feeling a self-love. If a man pays his taxes because 
he fears the consequences of tax evasion, then his actions will have no moral content; he 
was simply thwarted by his fear. Similarly, if a man decides to help the poor because he 
believes that doing so would help him gain the reputation of being magnanimous, then 
his action would also lack moral worth. Indeed, self-love, empirical as it is, can take on a 
myriad of forms. Most human actions are determined by feelings of self-love. Fear, love, 
envy, or even sympathy, are nothing but variations of self-love. They are all incited by 
experience, and can never replace the respect for the moral law.  
 Kant, however, does not believe that human beings ought to avoid the pursuit of 
happiness in order to ensure the attainment of genuine moral worth. For while it is true 
that genuine moral worth only be attained in situations where the moral law is in conflict 
with inclinations of happiness, the attainment of genuine moral worth is not a duty in 
itself. For a duty to attain genuine moral worth would imply that human beings must 
make the world as corrupt as possible. For only in the most corrupt societies will there 
never be any actions in conformity with the moral law, but incentivized by a desire for 
happiness. But, a duty to make the world corrupt, even if it means the attainment of 




corrupting his society only to make duties more difficult to conform, can the virtue of a 
single action justify all of his previous wickedness? Indeed, virtue shines the brightest 
among the greatest vice. A man who stands by his principles when doing so entails 
nothing but pain and suffering deserves to be praised, but there is nothing desirable in 
seeing a good man placed in such an awful society. We praise Cato the Younger for his 
justice, but we would much prefer if he lived in a society where doing good can also 
make him happy.  
 If the attainment of genuine moral worth is not a good in itself, then what is? For 
Kant, the answer to this question is the attainment of the good will, or a will that adopts 
moral principles and sets out to act upon them. Roughly speaking, the good will is good 
character.21 The Kantian standard to judge whether a person has good character is the 
extent to which his will is determined by pure reason, or intuitions without sensations. To 
the extent that pure reason is able to determine the will, it is practical. Hence, the good 
will is pure practical reason.  
As pure practical reason, the good will is indifferent to whether an action is 
determined by inclinations of happiness. For as long as an action is in conformity with 
the moral law, reason will have no objections. Indeed, it is possible to imagine that a 
person who holds himself to the highest moral standard may feel the need to suppress his 
desire for material pleasure. For as long he is uncertain of whether his motives are truly 
genuine, he cannot live with himself. For this person, his reputation to himself is the most 
important of all. He is indifferent even to other people’s opinions of him, so long as he 
himself knows that he has acted from duty. Pure reason, however, is indifferent to 
 




whether such a person will ever attain the honor he desires, for the desire to always act 
from duty is nothing but an inclination itself. For insofar as the conditions of virtue are 
empirical (i.e. wickedness), there can never be any guarantee that a person will always 
have the opportunity to act from duty. As a result, pure practical reason will never set it a 
duty to always act for the sake of the moral law. After all, where does the desire to 
suppress one’s inclinations for happiness even come from, if not from the likes of the 
Stoics? The very nature of the desire to suppress the inclinations of happiness is 
empirical; it is not a desire to conform to the moral law, but to reach a state of perfection 
in which everything goes according to one’s own way. The desire to suppress inclinations 
of happiness is nothing but an inclination of happiness itself, an inclination of self-love. 
The good will, however, is indifferent to such desires.  
Indeed, the good will must be distinguished from virtue and genuine moral worth. 
The good will, as pure practical reason, is simply a will that adopts moral laws by the 
rules of the categorical imperative and sets out to act upon them. Virtue and moral worth, 
on the other hand, are only the qualities of a certain kind of action determined by the 
good will. Namely, when duty is in conflict with inclinations of happiness. Moral worth 
is the value of actions from duty, and virtue is merely an adjective which describes the 
overcoming of inclinations that contradicts the moral law. Hence, the absence of virtue 
does not imply the nonexistence of the good will. In cases where a person is inclined to 
transgress the moral law, but complies anyway, the person’s action is said to contain 
genuine moral worth. In cases where a person does not feel inclined to transgress the 
moral law, he can still be said to have acted with a good will, but his action will lack 




is unaccompanied by the presence of virtue and genuine moral worth. The first is divine 
will, or the will of God. This is because God, insofar as he is infinite, has no desire for 
happiness. As a result, the divine will is determined by pure reason alone, and has no 
need to suppress inclinations of happiness. To the extent that God never has to overcome 
any adversity, his actions lack moral content, despite having a good will. The second case 
is a finite will that is so fortunately situated that he will never need to suppress his 
inclinations to do his duties, despite having decided to never transgress the moral law.22 
Both the divine will and the fortunate will are equally ineligible for virtue, but they are 




















Part II: On Happiness in the Constitution of the Highest Good 
 For Kant, the enjoyment of happiness belongs to a higher order of good known as 
the highest good. The highest good is both the most supreme as well as the most 
complete good that human beings can enjoy. It is the most supreme in the sense that it 
contains the supreme condition which makes everything else good. It is the most 
complete in the sense that it contains that which the supreme condition deems one worthy 
to enjoy. The supreme condition is the good will. That which the good will deems one 
worthy to enjoy is happiness.  
Section I: The Supremacy of the Highest Good 
 The good will is the supreme condition of the highest good because it is good 
without limitation.23 The unqualified goodness of the good will comes from its nature as 
pure practical reason. For pure practical reason belongs to the broader spectrum of pure 
reason, as the faculty which senses and processes pure intuitions. Hence, pure reason can 
be interpreted as the sixth sense, in addition to the five basic senses (i.e. sight, hearing, 
smell, taste, touch). By virtue of pure reason, human beings are able to sense what is 
beyond the material properties of an object, and tap into the noumenon, or the world of 
ideas. When a person sees a pie, his basic senses allow him to receive intuitions 
associated with sensations of seeing the pie, touching the pie, smelling the pie, or tasting 
the pie. These intuitions are derived from the material properties of the pie, which we 
may call its substance. Pure reason, however, allows human beings to sense the form of a 
pie. At the very basic level, pure reason allows us to sense that the pie is spatial and 
temporal. At a higher level, pure reason can allow us to sense that the pie is round, and 
 




from this, to derive the idea of a perfect circle. Eventually, pure reason will gather what it 
perceives to be the permanent features of a pie, and create the idea of a pie, or the form of 
a pie. The idea of a pie sets the fundamental limitations of what is a pie, and what is not a 
pie; the idea itself, when thought, is unaccompanied by the sensations of this or that pie in 
particular, but the permanent features of pies in general. As long as those fundamental 
limitations are not breached, the material composition of a particular pie is 
inconsequential. Hence, while there can be an infinite variety of pies based on the 
differences in their material composition, there can only be a single idea of the pie.  
 The Kantian term which denotes ideas of pure reason is a priori. It describes that 
which is before, or independent of experience. All concepts of pure reason, insofar as 
they are built from pure intuitions, are a priori concepts. Therefore, concepts of pure 
reason are not subject to the critique of experience, but of logic alone. As long as a 
concept of pure reason does not involve a logical contradiction, then it must be true 
without limitation. The good will, or good character, is an idea of pure reason. As a 
result, it shares the a priori nature of other ideas.  
Much like the idea of pies in general, the idea of the good will is built from what 
pure reason regards to be the permanent features of all virtues. Hence, the goodness of 
the good will is both unaffected and indifferent to any empirical conditions. The good 
will, as the idea of virtue, is the condition for virtues to even be considered as virtues. 
Any virtue that does not conform to the principles of the good will is not a virtue, just 
like how any pie that does not conform to the principles of a pie is not a pie. This is why 
even moderation and intelligence, to the extent that they are inconsistent with the moral 




“Intelligence, wit, judgment, and whatever talents of the mind one might want to 
name are doubtless in many respects good and desirable, as are such qualities of 
temperament as courage, resolution, perseverance. But they can also become 
extremely bad and harmful if the will, which is to make use of these gifts of 
nature and which in its special constitution is called character, is not good.”24 
Section II: The Completeness of the Highest Good 
 The highest good, however, cannot be complete without the attainment of 
happiness. For insofar as human beings have the desire for happiness, as well as the 
potential to be worthy of it, it is inconsistent with the freedom of human beings that they 
should not also take part in the enjoyment of happiness.25 Hence, in the attainment of the 
highest good, the attainment of the good will must be conjoined with the attainment of 
happiness.  
 The idea that happiness is an indispensable part of the highest good cannot be 
explained without assuming that the order of the universe is purposive. For insofar as the 
order of the universe is without purpose, every occurrence within it must be the result of 
blind chance. As a result, it would be absurd to expect a certain outcome simply because 
one has the desire for it, and is “worthy” of it. It would be spurious to assert that there is 
any necessary relationship between the enjoyment of happiness and the worthiness of 
happiness.  
 To begin with, it is entirely possible that the desire for happiness itself is without 
purpose. For while the desire to be happy has been responsible for much of mankind’s 
achievements over the course of history, it is unclear whether it was for the sake of these 
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developments that the desire to be happy was instilled into human beings in the first 
place. For to gain such knowledge, human beings must exist prior to the existence of the 
whole spatial-temporal universe, and everything that is said to be necessary to the 
existence of the human species, which, insofar as the existence of human beings is 
necessitated by the conditions thereafter, is impossible. Hence, as human beings 
themselves, we can never be sure of whether our desire for happiness exist for some 
purpose, or is simply the result of blind chance.  
 Yet, the desire for happiness is the very basis of Kant’s theory regarding the 
teleological system of nature. For the desire for happiness is the force which incited the 
development of history, from which the concept of the good will and the highest good 
itself originate. The desire for happiness brought man to “overcome his tendency towards 
laziness, and driven by his desire for honor, power, or property, to secure status among 
his fellows, whom he neither suffers, nor withdraws from.”26  As man exercises his 
freedom to pursue the happiness he desires, history develops. As history develops, its 
observers begin to deduce its patterns. This is how the study of political science began. 
As nature supplied Newton and Kepler with the means to deduce the laws of nature, so 
history, as the free play of the human will at large, supplied Kant with the means to 
deduce the laws of freedom. Kant’s moral theory, which places the attainment of the 
highest good as the end of history, would be impossible if the very force behind its 
development was the result of blind chance. For as long as the enjoyment of happiness is 
not the intended purpose of the desire for happiness, it will not be inconsistent for human 
 




beings not to take part in the enjoyment of happiness, despite having the desire and the 
potential to be worthy of it.  
 Hence, a presupposition of the constitution of the highest good is the existence of 
God, or a grand designer that is all-powerful, all-good, and all-wise. As Kant suggests, in 
the pursuit of the highest good, a necessary connection between the worthiness to be 
happy and the attainment of happiness must be postulated. As the ground of this postulate 
is the existence of God, who is the cause of nature by understanding and will.27 To the 
extent that there must be a necessary connection between the worthiness to be happy and 
the attainment of happiness, God is presumed to be intelligent. This is because only 
intelligent beings, or beings that can sense the ideas, can adopt principles that are 
indifferent to experience. To the extent that God has caused nature to bring about the 
attainment of the highest good in accordance with the law (i.e. the relationship between 
the worthiness to be happy and the enjoyment of happiness), he is presumed to have a 
free will. For only beings with a free will have the ability to act in accordance with a law, 
regardless of any empirical conditions.  
Qualifications 
 Regarding the constitution of the highest good, two qualifications must be made. 
The first is that the highest good can never be attainable for human beings. For as we 
have already discussed in part one, happiness, as “the state of a rational being in the 
world in the whole of whose existence everything goes according to his wish and will,” is 
simply unattainable.28 Insofar as the nature of happiness is empirical, its attainment is 
simply beyond the capacities of human beings, whose powers are finite. Hence, the best 
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that human beings can do is to live with a good will, and hope that nature is kind enough 
to reward them with the happiness they deserve. For Kant, the only being that enjoys the 
highest good is God. Only God, whose existence is beyond experience, can have 
complete control over what is within experience. For as long as a being exists within 
experience, the being itself must be finite. And as long as a being is finite, it can never 
subject what is beyond its powers under its control. Indeed, God’s enjoyment of 
happiness can seem tautological. For God, whose existence is beyond experience, has no 
desire for happiness in the first place; he has already attained what he would have desired 
if his existence was finite. The only human equivalent of the existence of God is death. 
For only a dead man, who no longer takes part in the world of experience, can have 
complete control over its desires; he has no desires, for he is dead. For this reason, the 
other presupposition of the idea of the highest good is the immortality of the soul.29 For 
while human beings cannot expect to enjoy the highest good in this world, the attainment 
of the highest good can nevertheless be thought of as possible in the afterlife. Should the 
soul have the power to survive in isolation from the body, the attainment of happiness can 
be regarded as being possible.  
The second qualification is that to the extent that the highest good is only possible 
by postulating the existence of God, the nature of the highest good is subjective. Indeed, 
one of the great themes of Kant’s critical philosophy is that human beings can only know 
what their faculties allow them to know. As a result, human beings can never assert the 
absolute reality of the objects of their knowledge. We can never be sure of whether what 
exists for us also exist for all other rational beings, for we cannot never be sure that other 
 




rational beings even sense the world in the same way as us. At the most basic level, it is 
unclear that all rational beings even interpret the world spatially and temporally. As a 
result, it is unclear whether what human beings may regard to be the highest good is also 
the highest good for other rational beings.  
Indeed, the second qualification is what gives strength to Kant’s moral theory. For 
in suggesting that human beings cannot assert the absolute reality of any object of 
knowledge in general, Kant’s critical philosophy has turned Hume’s radical skepticism 
on its head. For whereas Hume argues that human beings cannot assert the absolute 
reality of certain objects of knowledge (i.e. causality), Kant’s argument suggests that 
human beings cannot assert the absolute reality of any objects of knowledge (with 
exception to the existence of one’s self-consciousness). And since one cannot assert the 
absolute reality of any object of knowledge besides the existence of one’s own 
consciousness, all objects of knowledge are but plausible hypotheses. The only difference 
is which hypothesis is more plausible. Certainly, Kant has never gone as far as to suggest 
that he has settled the question regarding the vocation of man, though his theory does 
appeal to “a species so taken with its own superiority.”30 For it is in the nature of human 
beings to develop a certain feeling of indignation “when one sees men’s actions placed on 
the great stage of the world and finds that, despite some individuals’ seeming wisdom, in 
the large everything is finally woven together from folly and childish vanity and often 
even childish malice and destructiveness.”31 Of course, this is not to say that Kant’s 
moral theory was designed to appeal to the taste of human beings in general, but that as 
human beings, who are not indifferent to its own superiority among the rest of nature’s 
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creations, we are naturally disposed to prefer certain truth over others, especially in 
matters concerning the significance of our lives. In the great debate between the idea that 
history is the result of blind chance versus the idea that the existence of man is not 
without a purpose, it is in the nature of most human beings to be more inclined to follow 
the latter.   
Section III: On the Relationship between Morality and Happiness as Elements of 
the Highest Good 
 To the extent that morality and happiness are both elements of the highest good, 
the attainment of either element must be connected with the other.32 For Kant, there are 
three ways that this can take place. The first is an analytic form of relationship, in which 
the attainment of either element simultaneously implies the attainment of the other. The 
second is a synthetic form of relationship, in which the attainment of either element 
causes the attainment of the other. The third is also a form of synthetic form of 
relationship, in which the attainment of either element causes the attainment of the other, 
but only under certain empirical conditions. The nature of the first form of relationship is 
analytic a priori, the nature of the second form of relationship is synthetic a priori, and 
the nature of the third form of relationship is synthetic a posteriori.  
 For Kant, the first form of relationship is immediately ruled out. This is because 
to the extent that the nature of the relationship is analytic a priori, the attainment of either 
element must simultaneously guarantee the other. The only way in which this can happen 
is when one of the elements is contained in the other, analytically. That is, when the 
logical identity of one idea is identical with the other, in which case it is impossible to 
 




think of one idea without the other. For instance, the idea of a “bachelor” contains the 
idea of being “unmarried”. It is impossible to think of a bachelor that is not unmarried, 
for it is part of the logical identity of bachelors that they must be unmarried. The idea of 
being unmarried is identical with the idea of being a bachelor. As Kant proves in the 
Critique of Practical Reason, however, the logical identity of morality and happiness are 
simply different.33 Morality requires the exercise of the free will, while inclinations of 
happiness are but the result of blind force. The very nature of these elements is mutually 
exclusive, and as a result, it is impossible for either element to contain the other.  
 For Kant, the second form of relationship is also improbable. This is because to 
the extent that the nature of the relationship is a priori, the relationship between morality 
and happiness as cause and effect must be necessary. This implies that the attainment of 
morality must guarantee the attainment of happiness as a subsequent effect, which is 
impossible. As we explained in part one, the nature of happiness is empirical, which 
implies that the enjoyment of happiness demands complete control over nature. Such 
omnipotence, however, cannot be expected from the attainment of morality, which is 
simply the exercise of man’s freewill. To the extent that human beings are finite, no 
amount of power can ever ensure the enjoyment of happiness. Hence, the relationship 
between morality and happiness can never be a priori.  
 Therefore, only the third form of relationship can describe the connection between 
morality and happiness. The nature of this relationship is one of synthetic a posteriori, 
which describes most relationships in nature (i.e. physics, chemistry). In the case of 
morality and happiness, however, the relationship is more complicated than it seems. For 
 




insofar as the attainment of the good will must be a conscious decision, the determining 
grounds of morality are quite independent from the desire for happiness. The good will is 
a will that adopts and acts upon moral principles. The adoption of the good will itself is 
an act of the human will in its freedom. But human beings can only be free when they 
suppress inclinations of happiness. Hence, one does not have the least reason to expect 
the attainment of happiness if one decides to live by a certain set of principles even when 
they are in conflict with his desire for happiness. Indeed, Kant’s suggestion to think of 
happiness as a form of reward can be quite odd. For a reward is not attained by whoever 
shall be worthy of it himself, but rather, bestowed upon him by a third party. To the 
extent that the reward is bestowed by a third party, there is no immediate relation 
between the worthiness of the reward (i.e. the good will) and the reward itself 
(happiness). To the extent that the worthiness of the reward does not always imply the 
attainment of the reward, the third party which bestows the reward is not to be all-wise, 
or all-powerful. Therefore, a contradiction arises with regards to the nature of God. 
Namely, that insofar as the idea of the highest good postulates the existence of an 
omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being, why does the attainment of the good 
will not always guarantee the enjoyment of happiness?  
 One plausible suggestion to this problem is that God does not wish to take away 
from man the credit he deserves for attaining the good will. For as long as the attainment 
of morality will always lead to happiness, there can be no guarantee of whether a person 
has decided to be moral because he believes that such is the right thing to do or because 
he did so in order to be happy. Indeed, Kant does not simply believe that human beings 




are not inconsistent with the moral law. A person can always follow his inclinations and 
not transgress the moral law even when he is unconscious of the moral law. Such a 
person, however, cannot be considered as a moral being, and can never be worthy of the 
happiness he enjoys. For Kant, the best life is to live with a good will. But to live with a 
good will does not imply the suspension of the desire for happiness or the blind pursuit of 
happiness so long as one does not transgress the moral law. Rather, it is to be conscious 
of the moral law even during the pursuit of happiness, so that when the pursuit of 
happiness is in conflict with duty, one is readily available to take up the latter. He who 
takes up the life of a moral being does not expect the enjoyment of happiness. For he 
knows that there can be no guarantee that inclinations of happiness will always be 
consistent with duty. Hence, if a person has been successful all through his life in living 
in accordance with the moral law, he will have nothing to thank except for his own free 
will. It is as if that nature has “willed that if man should ever work himself up from the 
grossest barbarity to the highest level of sophistication, to inner perfection in his way of 
thinking and thereby to happiness (as far as it is possible on earth), he alone would have 













Part III: The Opponents of Kant’s Moral Theory 
 Kant’s moral theory mainly responds to two schools of thought: The Stoics, who 
believe that virtue is happiness, and the Epicureans, who believe that happiness is virtue. 
Unlike Kant, both schools hold virtue and happiness to be analytically related, but 
disagree as to which of the two contains the other. For the Stoics, happiness is contained 
in the practice of virtue. For the Epicureans, virtue is contained in the rational pursuit of 
happiness. In this section, we will discuss Kant’s response to both schools, beginning 
with the Epicureans.  
Section I: Refutation of the Epicurean Theory 
 In a nutshell, the Epicurean theory proceeds from the idea that actions determined 
by principles of happiness can in fact be moral. For Kant, however, this can never be true. 
To begin with, moral commandments are indifferent to any empirical conditions.35 The 
object of a moral command (which is none other than the satisfaction of the moral law 
itself), as well as the means to its satisfaction, are indifferent to experience. As a result, 
duties can be complied with under any condition, and ought to be complied with under 
any condition. The means as well as the object of duties are always constant. Principles 
of happiness, on the other hand, can never furnish any command that is indifferent to 
experience. This is because the object of happiness itself, including the means to its 
attainment, are simply empirical. The object of happiness, to the extent that the 
imagination is subject to the constant influence of changing conditions, is subject to 
constant change. As a result, the means to attain the object of happiness is subject to 
constant change. Principles of happiness can never yield the constancy of moral laws. 
 




Any principle of happiness, insofar as it is directed towards the attainment of an object 
that is empirical, simply cannot deliver what it promises consistently.   
 Secondly, principles of happiness, to the extent that the object of happiness is 
empirical, must conform to the feelings of the subject.36 Whatever the object of happiness 
is, it must be agreeable to the subject’s feelings of pleasure and displeasure. Hence, the 
determining ground of actions incentivized by the desire for happiness belongs to the 
senses. A person decides whether an object will make him happy by the feelings he 
expects from the object’s existence. That is, whether the object tastes good, sound good, 
smells good, or etc. Moral principles, on the other hand, are indifferent to the feelings of 
the senses. Moral laws are subject to laws independent of experience, namely, the laws of 
the understanding, or logic. For any action to be considered moral, the action must never 
be logically inconsistent with the principle which governs all moral laws, namely, the 
categorical imperative. As a result, principles of happiness and principles of morality are 
subject to completely different standards. Though the two set of principles can sometimes 
overlap, such as when a principle of happiness is not inconsistent with the laws of the 
understanding or when a principle of morality is not displeasing to a person’s feelings of 
pleasure and displeasure, it is not the standard by which they incidentally conform to that 
sets the parameters of its authority. Fundamentally, principles of happiness are always 
judged by the feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and never by its logical consistency 
with the categorical imperative.  
 Thirdly, principles of happiness are determined by matter, whereas principles of 
morality are determined by form. By matter, Kant means that which is related to the 
 




empirical conditions of an action. When the matter of an action is removed, all that 
remains is the form. For instance, when a person deliberates whether he should tell the 
truth, the content of the truth is the matter, while the act of telling the truth in isolation 
from the content is the form. If a person decides whether he should tell the truth based on 
the content of the truth, then his decision is incentivized by a desire for happiness. If a 
person decides whether he should tell the truth based on whether a person should always 
tell the truth, then his decision is incentivized by a respect for duty. To the extent that the 
matter of an action decides whether the action should be done, one can never go as far as 
to suggest that the action ought to be done under any condition. Insofar as the object of 
happiness as well as the means to its attainment are subject to constant change, the same 
truth cannot always yield pleasure. An action determined by matter can never be 
determined by form at the same time, even if a person is lucky enough to be placed in 
conditions where to act in accordance with the moral law will always yield pleasure. In 
such case, the action is merely consistent with the action determined by form. The origins 
of the incentives are nevertheless different.  
Qualifications 
 Kant’s refutation of the Epicurean theory is not simply a critique of Epicurus. 
Rather, it is a critique of the eudemonism which stems from the basic premises of the 
Epicurean theory. For contrary to what one might infer from the Epicurean theory, 
Epicurus himself “reckoned the most disinterested practice of the good among the ways 
of enjoying the most intimate delight and included in his scheme of pleasure (by which 




the strictest moral philosopher might require”. 37  Epicurus regarded the substance of 
happiness to be empirical, but the form to be intellectual. He does not deny that happiness 
is the satisfaction of desires, but he believes that desires can be constrained by virtue of 
the will. The more human beings moderate their desires, the more likely it is that they 
will be able to satisfy their desires. Virtue, therefore, consists in the rational 
understanding of one’s power to satisfy one’s desires. This is why Epicurus’ own life was 
in fact very similar to the Stoics. The only difference between the two schools is their 
incentive. For the Epicureans, the incentive to live a moderate life was for the sake of 
happiness. For the Stoics, the incentive to live a moderate life was for the sake of virtue. 
Therefore, the Epicurean understanding of happiness is rather similar to Kant’s early 
interpretation.38 The early Kant, who also regarded the substance of happiness to be 
empirical, but the form to be intellectual, held happiness to be a state of contentment 
attainable in this world.  
 If the constrain of desire is virtue, then virtue, for the Epicureans, is moderation. 
For Kant, however, this is insufficient. As he writes in the Groundwork:  
“Moderation in emotions and passions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not 
only good in many respects but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth 
of a person. But they are far from being rightly called good without qualification 
(however unconditionally they were commended by the ancients). For without the 
principles of a good will, they can become extremely bad; the coolness of a villain 
makes him not only much more dangerous but also immediately more abominable 
in our eyes than he would have been regarded by us without it.”39 
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Indeed, moderation has been the subject of many discussions among the ancients. For 
while many agree that moderation is a virtue, few agree on what is moderate. A person 
may be moderate in his desire for money, but immoderate in his lust for political power. 
Another may be moderate in his lust for political power, but immoderate in his piety 
towards god. To the extent that moderation consists in the suppression of desire, it seems 
that human beings can always be immoderate in some respect. To the extent that human 
life involves a constant succession of desires, human beings must understand what is 
moderate in each case in order to maintain a moderate lifestyle throughout one’s whole 
existence. Indeed, the problem with moderation for Kant is not that moderation is not a 
virtue in itself. For one can certainly argue that in the aforementioned passage, he who is 
moderate with regards to material possessions has not been moderate in his desire for 
villainous things. It is not merely incidental that Kant did not specify what exactly it was 
that the coolheaded villain did. Whatever it may be, it is certainly possible to think that 
the coolheaded villain was immoderate in that particular respect. But this leads to the 
question of whether it is always possible for human beings to know what is moderate in 
every case. This is precisely Kant’s criticism of moderation as a moral doctrine, namely, 
that moderation alone is simply imprecise. At any rate, moderation as a moral doctrine 
still requires human beings to examine what is moderate in each case before arriving at a 
decision. The process can be very time consuming and complicated, leading to the 
potential that many people can even up with the wrong decisions. Therefore, moderation 
as a moral doctrine must be replaced by something more accessible for the masses. For 
Kant, that replacement is the categorical imperative, and it simply states: “Act only 




universal law.”40 The categorical imperative is the formula by which all moral laws ought 
to be established. By virtue of the categorical imperative, human beings will be able to 
know exactly what is in accordance with duty and what is not.  
Section II: Refutation of the Stoic Theory 
 The Stoic theory, on the other hand, also proceeds from the idea that the 
relationship between virtue and happiness is analytic, but that it is virtue which contains 
happiness. The Stoic argument is that “virtue is the whole highest good, and happiness is 
only the consciousness of this possession as belonging to the state of the subject.”41 For 
Kant, however, the Stoic theory is just as absurd as the Epicurean one. For while it is 
possible to think that actions from duty warrant the enjoyment of happiness, it simply 
defies the rules of logic to assert that the attainment of what is empirical (happiness) can 
nevertheless be unconditional (a priori). To guarantee (a priori) the attainment of 
happiness, the nature of happiness must be immaterial. Indeed, one of the presuppositions 
of the Stoic theory is that happiness is not simply physical. The Stoics distinguish 
happiness from pleasure, as something beyond experience.  
 Kant, however, cannot accept happiness to be anything beyond experience. For as 
long as the enjoyment of happiness can be attained from duty, one can never be sure as to 
whether the incentive to act in accordance with the moral law is genuine. The early Kant, 
who held the substance of happiness to be empirical, but the form to be intellectual, was 
subject to such criticism. It was to refute his critics on this account that he came to argue 
that happiness is empirical in every respect.42 The Stoic theory, like the early Kant, is 
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subject to the same criticisms. No matter how strongly a Stoic believes that his incentive 
to be virtuous is pure, the fact that the final state of his attempt will necessarily yield a 
state of happiness will forever discredit his moral incentive. For Kant, however, nothing 
should ever discredit a human being’s virtue. If a man has ever decided to act from duty, 
then he must have nothing to thank except for his own free will. As a result, happiness 
ought to never become a necessary consequence of virtue.  
 From an anatomical perspective (for a lack of better words), Kant also believes 
that the Stoics have come to expect too much from mankind’s limited capacities. As he 
writes: 
“The Stoics, on the contrary, had chosen their supreme practical principle quite 
correctly, namely virtue, as the condition of the highest good; but inasmuch as 
they represented the degree of virtue required by its pure law as fully attainable in 
this life, they not only strained the moral capacity of the human being, under the 
name of a sage, far beyond all the limits of his nature and assumed something that 
contradicts all cognition of the human being, but also and above all they would 
not let the second component of the highest good, namely happiness, hold as a 
special object of the human faculty of desire but made their sage, like a divinity in 
his consciousness of the excellence of his person, quite independent of nature 
(with respect to his own contentment), exposing him indeed to the ills of life but 
not subjecting him to them (at the same time representing him as also free from 
evil);”43 
For Kant, human beings are beings of two worlds: the noumenon and the phenomenon. 
As noumenal beings, human beings are free. As phenomenal beings, human beings are 
subject to the forces of nature. As a result, the human will is determined by two elements: 
reason, which taps into the noumenon, and the desire for happiness, which is subject to 
 




changes in experience. To the extent that human beings are finite, much of mankind’s 
decisions must be determined by the desire for happiness. For without preference for 
what is pleasurable over what is not, the human species would have perished a long time 
ago. Of course, not all actions determined by the desire for happiness are inconsistent 
with the moral law. But in order for human beings to always act in accordance with the 
moral law, human beings must be omniscient. Without infinite reason, human beings will 
always have the potential to act against the moral law, despite having a good will. For the 
attainment of the good will does not imply that he who has attained the good will will 
never act inconsistently with the moral law. The good will is merely a will that adopts 
moral principles and sets out to act upon them; it does not imply knowledge of all moral 
laws. There will always be instances when a person does not have the time to stop and 
think of whether his actions are in conformity with the moral law. There will also be 
instances when a person incorrectly believes his actions to be in accordance with the 
moral law. As a result, human beings are never able to act in conformity with the moral 
law at all times. The only way in which human beings would be able to live in complete 
conformity with the moral law is if human beings no longer inhabited in finite bodies, 
when the soul is the only thing that remains. For this reason, the immortality of the soul is 
also one of the postulates of Kant’s moral theory.44 
 Fundamentally, Kant’s disagreement with the Stoics lies with their understanding 
of the human condition. For whereas the Stoics believe the complete conformity of the 
will with the moral law to be something attainable over the lifespan of a single human 
being, Kant believes that such conformity of the will can never be attained by any human 
 




being, though the human species as a whole is infinitely advancing towards it. Complete 
conformity with the moral law requires infinite reason, which is impossible for human 
beings. To the extent that knowledge of good and evil must be attained in order to 
achieve complete conformity with the moral law, the attempt to attain complete morality 
requires enlightenment. To the extent that human reason is finite, there will always be 
instances when human actions are inconsistent with the moral law. As a result, the road to 
complete conformity with the moral law is a road of infinite progress. Indeed, the Kantian 
view of the human condition is analogous to the asymptote, which describes a line that is 
infinitely approaching zero, but never to reach it. Such paradox precisely describes the 
condition of human history. To the extent that every subsequent generation builds upon 
the knowledge of previous generations, future generations will always be closer to 
achieving complete conformity with the moral law. To the extent that every generation 
will always be infinitely distant from achieving complete conformity with the moral law, 
no generation can ever be said to have made any progress.   
 
